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1. Introduction 
 
Water scarcity issues are a cause for serious concern in arid and semi-arid regions and 
existing water shortages are predicted to escalate in both frequency and duration over the 
next century (UNEP, 2003). Global water consumption grew sixfold between 1900 and 
1995, more than double the rate of population growth, and continues to rise with growing 
farming, industry, and domestic demand. By 2025, the number of countries qualifying as 
water scarce is anticipated to rise to 35 (from 20 in 1990). Given that water provides one 
of the most important life-support functions, ensuring food security through agricultural 
production and enabling the existence of all ecosystems, the allocation of scarce surface 
and groundwater resources in an efficient manner is of paramount importance. The 
significance of groundwater resources should not be underestimated as this resource 
represents around 90% of the world’s readily available freshwater resources and some 1.5 
billion people depend upon it for drinking water. In addition to the quantitative shortages 
of water resulting from demand and supply imbalances, water scarcity in arid and semi-
arid regions is further exacerbated by deteriorating water quality caused by point and 
non-point source pollution.  
 
In Europe, industry accounts for 54% of total water consumption, agricultural water use 
accounts for about 33%, while 13% is used for domestic purposes. The driving forces of 
water demand are strongly linked with national and international social and economic 
policies, and additional forces of water shortages are due to natural variability in water 
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availability (rainfall) and changes in Europe’s climate. These cases are most pronounced 
in the Mediterranean and as can be seen from the case studies provided in previous 
chapters in this book (Cyprus, Crete, Sicily, Corsica and Mallorca), in many areas 
conflicting demands for water in different sectors is resulting in unsustainable water use 
or is at risk of over-extraction. Water scarcity problems can constitute a threat to 
sustainable development and have major environmental, social, economic, and political 
repercussions. Typical consequences associated with water scarcity include water surface 
exploitation, reservoir and lake eutrophication, aquifer exploitation, minimum and 
ecological flow, and desertification and erosion in basins, among other things (EEA, 
1996).    
 
The need for an integrated approach to water resources management has thus become 
increasingly evident over the past years. In response to this, EU legislation has striven to 
develop on a more comprehensive approach culminating in the EU Water Framework 
Directive (WFD). The Directive establishes a framework for the protection of all water 
bodies (including inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal water and 
groundwater). The key objective is to achieve good water status for all waters by 2015.  
 
This chapter provides the economic perspective to implementing integrated water 
resources management and describes the valuation techniques and economic instruments 
that have been developed and are available to help price water efficiently, and allocate it 
to it’s highest valued user.   
 
2. A Manual for Implementing Integrated Water Management: The Economic 
Perspective 
 
The implementation of an integrated water management framework from an economic 
perspective can be described in a three step approach consisting of: 
 
1. The economic characterization of water in the region, 
2. The assessment of the recovery of the costs of water services, and 
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3. The economic assessment of potential measures for balancing water demand and 
supply. 
 
A comprehensive economic characterization of the water in the region requires first of all 
that the economic significance of water in the region is evaluated. This involves an 
assessment of the residential, industrial, agricultural and tourism water needs in the area. 
This will include information on the population connected to public water supply system 
vs those with self-supply, the total cropped area, cropping patterns, gross production and 
income of the farming population for the agricultural sector, and the total number of 
tourist days and employment and turnover in the tourism sector. The key economic 
drivers influencing pressures and water uses need to be determined including (a) the 
general socio-economic indicators such as population growth, income, and employment; 
(b) the key sector policies that significantly influence water use (e.g., agricultural and 
environmental policies); (c) the development of planned investments likely to affect 
water availability; and (d) the implementation of future policies (environmental and 
other) that is likely to affect water use.   These economic drivers will need to be 
accounted in a dynamic perspective, i.e., to determine how these are likely to evolve over 
time. The final component of the economic characterization of water in a region is the 
application of appropriate methodologies to assess sector-specific water demand. This 
involves deriving the marginal value of water in consumption and production, the price 
and income elasticity of demand, the marginal and average willingness to pay for public 
goods and quality changes of common access resources, and the associated risk 
parameters 
 
The second step in implementing integrated water management is to conduct a cost-
recovery assessment of water services. This involves identifying the current water 
services costs by sector and the users and or institutions that bear them. For example, 
operation and maintenance costs are often subsidized by the government and frequently, 
the social opportunity costs and external costs of extracting surface and groundwater are 
not reflected in market prices at all. Current cost-recovery levels must also be determined 
incorporating all financial, environmental and resource costs and the institutional set-up 
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for cost-recovery such as the price and tariff structure, the existence of direct and indirect 
subsidies and cross-subsidies. If cost-recovery is incomplete, the potential mechanisms 
available for this include taxes on water abstraction, charges for the use of the irrigation 
system, the selling of permits for water abstraction, etc. Clearly, affordability for water 
users is also an important objective, and potential measures to address equity will also 
need to be identified. These may include subsidies to low-income households (mainly for 
agricultural water use) and capital subsidies on investments on infrastructure.  
 
The third and final step is to conduct an economic assessment of potential measures for 
balancing water supply and demand. Least-cost measures may include the use of 
economic instruments such as abstraction and pollution taxes, tradable permits; 
alternative measures to increase awareness regarding water scarcity; the use of direct 
controls on pollution charges to alleviate water quality issues; and the use of agri-
environmental programs to provide financial and technical assistance such as the 
adoption of water-saving technologies. These least-cost measures need to be assessed in 
terms of financial costs (capital, operation and maintenance, and administrative costs) 
and indirect costs (changes in environmental quality and the costs of preventative and 
mitigation measures). Finally, the impacts of these measures on key economic sectors and 
uses need to be evaluated. This includes the net impacts on public expenditures and 
revenues and the wider economic and social impacts such as on patterns of employment.  
In the case that the achievement of good water status has significant adverse effects on 
the wider environment and human activities, then this constitutes ‘disproportionality’ in 
which case there may be time derogations or else the application of less stringent 
objectives may be applied.  
 
The following section provides an overview of the market and government failures 
leading to the unsustainable use of water resources, in terms of over-exploitation and 
excessive pollution. This provides a backdrop for section 4 which presents a typology of 
economic instruments and measures that are available for efficient surface and 
groundwater water resources management from both a water quantity and water quality 
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perspective. The advantages and limitations of these are identified and examples of where 
these have been implemented are described. 
 
3. Market Failures in Water Resources Management and Optimal Use 
 
3.1 Market and Government Failures 
 
Water services are public goods, that is, provision to one individual does not prevent 
others from using it. This is a form of market failure and can result in under-investment 
and misallocation of resources. Other water services are characterized by economies of 
scale, which can lead to monopolistic power and socially inefficient allocation.  
 
For groundwater the prevailing externalities are of a different sort. Exploitation of a stock 
of groundwater is typically a common property problem since there is limited access to 
the resource. The finite stock implies that each unit of groundwater is extracted is no 
longer available for others to use, therefore there is little incentive to save water for future 
use, which in turn leads to overpumping. Provencher and Burt (1993) call this the stock 
externality. In addition, there is a pumping cost externality: As the water table declines 
with increasing extraction, the pumping cost to the firm increases, as do the pumping 
costs of the other firms exploiting the resource. Since a firm does not take the other firms 
costs into account, a second externality is generated. Finally, is the risk externality, which 
is caused by the inherent value of groundwater as a substitute source of water in times of 
surface water shortages.  
 
With regard to surface and groundwater quality, excessive pollution is caused by the 
existence of environmental externalities. Examples include effluent from waste treatment 
plants, factories, and urban and agricultural run-off. In these cases, the social costs of 
producing the good is ignored, leading to artificially low production costs and hence 
over-production of the good that generates the externality.  
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Importantly, economic decisions need to be made compatible with social objectives, i.e. 
efficiency and equity considerations. Equity refers to the distribution of wealth among 
sectors and individuals. Government failures can also lead to misallocation of resources 
as for example subsidies for agricultural production leading to the over-exploitation of 
water resources for irrigation purposes.  
 
 
3.2 Optimal Allocation of Scarce Water Resources 
 
As a result of the above forementioned issues, water supply and demand imbalances 
occur and water is not allocated efficiently amongst the resource users.  Allocative 
efficiency requires the marginal value of water to be the same for the last unit of water 
consumed by each user and that it is equal to the cost of supplying water.  Otherwise, 
society would benefit by allocating water to another sector where the returns would be 
higher. The efficiency criterion maximizes the total value of production across all 
affected sectors of the economy. There are spatial and temporal considerations that need 
to be taken into account when valuing water which vary according to the quality and it’s 
use, thus making water a more challenging resource to manage efficiently.  
 
The optimal price of water is illustrated in figure 1 below. If there is a single source of 
water with several users at different locations then the marginal private cost (MPC) of 
water at the source is the cost of operating the facility plus the user cost. The marginal 
cost of water at a more distant location is the MPC (as before) plus the marginal cost of 
transporting the water from the source to the user, also know as the marginal conveyance 
cost (MCC).  There are also environmental costs associated with removing water from a 
lake or a reservoir as this may have detrimental impacts on fish populations and other 
wildlife. The marginal environmental costs are denoted by MEC. Finally there may also 
be future costs associated with the extraction of water due to uncertainty in precipitation, 
denoted here by MFC. Examples of these costs include reduction in future productivity 
due to accumulation processes such as soil salinity or water logging.  
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Price 
MPC+MCC+MEC+MFC 
MPC+MCC+MEC 
MPC+MCC 
MPC 
MB
XA 
XB  
 
MB is the marginal benefit curve and reflects the economic benefits that water buyers 
obtain from purchasing water. The intersection of demand (MB) with the sum of all costs 
reflect the socially optimum outcome where the amount of water extracted/used is given 
by quantity XA. However, in most cases future and externality costs are not normally 
taken into account, leading to an equilibrium at point B, where the amount of water 
extracted/used is XB, which is inefficiently high. 
Water 
Quality 
Source: D. Zilberman and K. Schoengold, 2005 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Non-Market Valuation Techniques 
 
In part as a result of these market and government failures, degradation and loss of the 
environmental functions of water resources has been prolific in the last century. However, 
due to the observed loss of many ecological and hydrological services formerly provided 
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free by aquatic systems and the consequent environmental and economic costs of this loss, 
aquatic system protection and conservation has become an internationally important 
political issue. 
 
In any aquatic system a number of processes may be occurring to a greater or lesser extent. 
These may be of a physical, chemical, biological or ecological nature. As a consequence of 
the occurrence of such processes, aquifers will perform a number of ecosystem preservation  
functions. For example, the process of water storage in an aquifer may result in a wetland, 
which is performing the function of flood attenuation, while the processes of denitrification 
and plant nutrient uptake may contribute to the ability to perform the function of water 
quality maintenance through the removal of nutrients from surface water and shallow 
groundwater. Plant uptake of nutrients may also result in the performance of other functions 
such as the provision of support to the food web and habitat, demonstrating that an 
individual process may contribute to a variety of wetland functions.  
 
The benefits of these water resources functions to the society (and social welfare), however, 
is not confined to their physical functions referred in the previous paragraph. For example, 
they may be supporting wetlands used for recreation such as sailing, shooting and fishing; 
be held dear as intrinsic parts of landscapes or as wild places; and be valued, as habitats, for 
their biodiversity. Moreover, water storage in aquifers may provide direct economic benefits 
but the value of aquatic systems, like that of nature in general, also has cultural and social 
dimensions. Such values, constituted through social processes, represent as much ethical, 
aesthetic and cultural concerns as scientific knowledge. In particular, nature's popular 
significance resides largely in meanings and values other than those bestowed by scientific 
understanding. But, the physical functions performed by an aquatic system take place with 
or without the presence of society, usually as part of a self sustaining ecosystem (intrinsic 
features), whereas other aquatic systems values require the presence of society (extrinsic 
features), and these will vary over time and space while the functions may not.  
 
Although the sources of aquatic system values are diverse and heterogeneous, much of 
national policy all over the world relating to aquatic systems (if existent at all) has arisen 
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solely from scientific reports, which in some cases are flawed or only locally applicable. It is 
now widely accepted that decisions about environmental and groundwater resource 
management related policies and projects should not be made on scientific and/or economic 
(including financial, management, restoration costs and benefits) grounds alone; social and 
cultural aspects also need to be heeded. For the integration of these values policymakers 
have to explore water values held by 'ordinary' citizens in the context of developing a non-
monetary approach to valuation and suggest how these values should be integrated in water 
resources management policies. 
 
 
Figure 1: A simple framework relating water resources to environmental functions, 
human benefits and anthropocentric values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water Resources  
Processes 
Water Resources System 
Anthropocentric Values: 
 
- Direct Current Use Values 
- Indirect Current Use Values 
- Option Use Values 
- Existence Ecosystems (Non-
Use) Values
 
Human 
Benefits 
 
Environment
al functions 
of Water 
Resources 
Value elicitation by means of valuation 
methods: 
- Hedonic Pricing 
- Tavel Cost Pricing 
- Residual Analysis 
- Replacement/Restoration Cost Method 
- Contingent Valuation 
- Choice Experiments 
- Meta-analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In economics, the basis of value is determined by individual preferences. Preferences 
reflect the utilities that are expected to be derived from the consumption of resources, 
given the needs, wants and wishes of consumers. In order to correctly evaluate a given 
resource, one needs to consider the Total Economic Value (TEV) of the resource i.e., the 
whole class of values that have a basis in human preferences. TEV is composed of direct 
and indirect use values, as well as non-use values. Current use value derives from the 
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utility gained by an individual from the consumption of a good or service, or from the 
consumption of others (e.g. parents may obtain utility from their children's consumption). 
Current use value is composed of direct use value (commercial and recreational) and 
indirect use value (such as amenity value or general ecosystem support). Option Value 
derives from retaining an option to a good or service for which future demand is 
uncertain. If we are not certain about either our future preferences or about future 
availability, we may be willing to pay a premium (the option value) to keep the option of 
future use open. The option value an additional value to any utility that may arise if and 
when the good is actually consumed. 
 
Existence Value derives from human preferences for the existence of resources as such, 
unrelated to any use too which such resources may be put. Individual preferences may 
exist for maintaining resources in their present forms even where no actual or future `use' 
is expected to be made of the resource.  
 
Given that many of these components of value are not reflected in market prices of water, 
economists will attempt to estimate the true resource value through user willingness to 
pay (WTP) for a given quantity and quality of supply. Valuation techniques are therefore 
necessary to assign appropriate prices that will enable water to be allocated in the most 
efficient manner. A variety of these techniques have been developed over the years to 
address this issue and are generally classified as revealed preference techniques and 
stated preference techniques.1 Revealed preference techniques use data on goods or 
services that are marketed and do have observable prices, in order to value some 
environmental attribute, which is embodied in the marketed goods and services, but is not 
traded itself in any particular market.  In stated preference techniques, individuals are 
provided with a constructed scenario in which they are asked how much they are willing 
to pay to changes in environmental quantity. 
 
                                                 
1 A comprehensive and state of the art review of valuation techniques and relevant empirical applications 
from Europe and the rest of the world can be found in Koundouri (2005). 
 10
Within the category of revealed preference techniques for water resources, one approach 
is the residual value method which values all inputs for the good produced at market 
price, except for the water resource itself. The residual value of the good is attributed to 
the water input. For example, one can value water as an input in the production of 
different crops. A problem with this methodology is that only part of the use value of 
water can be captured.  
 
Another approach is the hedonic pricing method whereby implicit prices of 
characteristics which differentiate closely related goods are estimated [Griliches, 1971; 
Rosen, 1974]. Suppose that an environmental resource that you wish to value is not itself 
traded in any market, possibly because the resource is a public good. As a result, no 
market price exists which can reveal preferences or willingness to pay for the resource. 
Suppose also that the resource can be defined in terms of services it yields or an 
`attribute' it embodies. This attribute may be embodied in other goods or assets which are 
marketed, and which do have observable prices. For example, farm prices in an area with 
good groundwater availability will be higher than areas with little or no groundwater 
availability. By comparing farm prices in different areas and accounting for other 
differences, the remaining difference in farm price can be attributed to groundwater 
availability. An example of hedonic pricing applied to evaluate water quality in Cyprus is 
given by Koundouri and Pashardes (2003). Using data on 193 parcels of land on variables 
such as price, usage (agriculture vs tourism), proximity to the sea, and other variables, 
they estimate the marginal willingness to pay to avoid a marginal increase in the 
salinization of fresh groundwater supplies beneath owner’s land.  
 
A limitation of the hedonic pricing technique is that it is only capable of measuring that 
subset of use values for which people are willing to pay and do so indirectly through the 
related market. It also relies on the assumption that consumers are fully informed about 
the qualities of the attributes being valued, otherwise hedonic price estimates are of little 
relevance. There are other problems in that the hedonic price equation and the second-
step demand equation impose rather strong assumptions about separability of consumers' 
utility functions. The functional forms of regression models that are usually chosen 
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impose weak separability, permitting rent-pollution and demand functions to be estimated 
independently of demand equations for other goods that consumers purchase. However, 
standard consumer demand theory and evidence from applied studies doubt the validity 
of weak separability, particularly when large changes occur, as is often the case when 
dealing with environmental projects. 
 
Travel cost models (also known as recreation demand models) is an alternative revealed 
preference technique which focuses on choice of trips or visits for recreational purposes 
and looks at the level of satisfaction, time, and money spent in relation to the activity. 
Patterns of travel to a particular sight can be used to analyze how individuals value the 
site and for example, the water quality of a river stretch. See Bockstael et al (1987) for an 
example.  
 
Within the category of stated preference techniques, one can use contingent valuation 
methods, choice modeling approaches, and meta-analysis. Many water quality evaluation 
problems occur in a framework for which no value measures can be derived from 
observing individual choices through a market. This is mainly due to the public good 
aspect of groundwater quality. Other examples where actual consumer choices are 
unobservable are cases where the policy change is potential rather than actual. In such 
cases, respondents are offered conditions simulating a hypothetical market in which they 
are asked to express willingness to pay for existing or potential environmental conditions 
not registered on any market. The most common form of questioning on hypothetical 
futures is called the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). This involves asking 
individuals directly what they would be willing to pay contingent on some hypothetical 
change in the future state of the world (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Alternatively, this 
can be expressed as the minimum monetary compensation they would accept to go 
without an increase in that good or tolerate a decrease (willingness to accept 
compensation WTA).  Thus, an individual’s WTP or WTAC will depend on the 
description of the contingent market, the information they have about the environmental 
good, (which depends partly on what they are told about it as part of the CVM survey,  
their own preferences and their budget constraints, and the availability of substitutes and 
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complements. In brief, a CVM exercise consists of a description of the environmental 
change in question and the contingent market, establishing a bid vehicle (e.g. an increase 
in monthly water bills), and a reason for payment (e.g. to reduce water shortage incidents 
from three times a month to once a month). The WTP bids can be elicited in a variety of 
methods including an open-ended format, a bidding game, a payment card or a single or 
double-bounded dichotomous choice mechanism. Once the mean and median WTP has 
been estimated, the average bid can be aggregated to a population total value.  
 
There are many problems associated with CVM that may bias the value estimates (e.g. 
interviewing bias, non-response bias, strategic bias, embedding effects, yea-saying bias, 
hypothetical bias, information bias), and best practice guidelines for conducting CVM 
studies have been developed (NOAA, 1993). These recommend for example the use of  
dichotomous choice formats over other alternatives, that in-person interviews should be 
conducted as opposed to e.g. mail surveys, and that WTP, not WTAC, measures should 
be elicited.  
 
Partly as a response to these problems, valuation practitioners are increasingly interested 
in alternative stated preference formats such as Choice Modeling (CM). CM is a family 
of survey-based methodologies (including choice experiments, contingent ranking, 
contingent rating and paired comparisons) for modeling preferences for goods, which can 
be described in terms of their attributes and of the levels they take. Respondents are asked 
to rank, rate or chose their most preferred alternative. By including price/cost as one of 
the attributes of the good, willingness to pay can be indirectly recovered from people's 
rankings, ratings or choices. An excellent critical review of CM alternatives and 
investigation of their potential to solve some of the major biases associated with standard 
CVM is provided by Hanley et al. (2001). In the class of CM alternatives, probably the 
one receiving the most attention is the choice experiment method (CEM). This is a 
survey-based technique which can estimate the total economic value of an environmental 
stock/flow or service and the value of its attributes, as well as the value of more complex 
changes in several attributes. Each respondent is presented with a series of alternatives of 
the environmental stock/flow or service with varying levels of its attributes and asked to 
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choose their most preferred alternative in each set of alternatives. CEM eliminates or 
minimises several of the CVM problems (e.g. strategic bias, yea-saying bias, embedding 
effects). An example of a choice experiment method applied to wetlands evaluation is 
that of Carlsson et al. (2003), who estimate the values of both use and non-use values of 
Staffanstorp wetland in Sweden. The selection of attributes and levels that they select 
include biodiversity (low, medium, high), fish (yes, no), surrounding vegetation (forest, 
meadow), walking facilities (yes, no), and a cost attribute (varying from SEK 200-850). 
The choice sets are then constructed using experimental design methods and the survey 
sent out via mail to 1200 randomly selected individuals living in Staffanstorp. Using 
econometric models, they find that biodiversity levels and walking facilities are the two 
greatest contributors to welfare, whereas some other attributes led to a decline in welfare.   
 
Recent years have seen a growing interest, both from academics and policy makers, in the 
potential for producing generally applicable models for the valuation of non-market 
environmental goods and services, which do not rely upon expensive and time-
consuming original survey work, but rather extrapolate results from previous studies of 
similar assets. Such methods are called meta-analysis for the use and non-use values 
generated by environmental resources. Meta-analysis is the statistical analysis of the 
summary of findings of empirical studies, that is, the statistical analysis of a large 
collection of results from individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings. 
Meta-analysis offers a transparent structure with which to understand underlying patterns 
of assumptions, relations and causalities, so permitting the derivation of useful 
generalizations without violating more useful contingent or interactive conclusions. 
The increase in meta-analytical research seems to have been principally triggered by: 
1. Increases in the available number of environmental valuation studies; 
2. The seemingly large differences in valuation outcomes as a result of the use of 
different research designs; 
3. The relatively high costs of carrying out environmental valuation studies and the 
increasing demand for transferable valuation results. 
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Brouwer et al 2004 present such a meta-analysis for the use and non-use values generated 
by wetlands across Europe and North America.  
 
As can be seen, each of the valuation have advantages and disadvantages associated with 
them, and depending on the component of total economic value one is trying to estimate, 
some methods are more suitable than others. Once realistic estimates of surface and 
groundwater values are available, it is then necessary for governments to determine 
which policy measures are most suitable to achieve the desired outcomes. 
 
4. Economic Instruments for Efficient Surface and Groundwater Management 
   
A number of economic instruments are available that can provide the appropriate 
incentives for efficient surface and groundwater resources extraction and management. 
Though economic instruments to manage surface water and groundwater are similar, they 
are not identical due to certain special characteristics associated with groundwater. These 
include the relatively high cost and complexity of assessing groundwater, the highly 
decentralized nature of resource use and the ensuing high monitoring costs, and the long 
time-lags and near irreversibility of most aquifer contamination. The selection and use of 
economic instrument will also depend on current hydrology, economic, social, and 
political considerations.  
 
4.1 Standards and Quotas 
A legal water standard or quota can be introduced that places restrictions on the amount 
of water that can be extracted for use. It will be effective if water users face substantial 
monetary penalties for lowering the water level below this standard or not adhering to the 
quota. Water quality standards may also be established. Standards and quotas do not 
strictly qualify as economic instruments as they do not improve economic efficiency and 
do not introduce incentives to innovate. The financial impact is not always equitably 
distributed among affected parties, since there are differences in the vulnerability of areas 
to changes induced by these instruments. Differentiated standards and quotas, however, 
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will pose a large burden on the administrative capacity. Usually serious resistance is 
raised against the introduction of these policy instruments. 
 
4.2 Water Abstraction Taxes 
Theoretically a tax can be used to restrain water users from lowering the surface or 
groundwater level below a certain standard.  
 
Area pricing is probably the most common form of water pricing whereby users are 
charged for water used per irrigated area, and may depend on crop choice, the extent of 
crop irrigated, and the irrigation method and season.  In contrast, output pricing and input 
pricing are probably the least common forms of water pricing. Output pricing methods 
involve charging a fee for each unit of output produced per user whereas input pricing 
involves charging users for water consumption through a tax on inputs, e.g. a charge for 
each kilogram of fertilizer purchased.  
 
The efficiency of water abstraction taxes is relative and depends on technical and 
institutional factors. Volumetric pricing is the optimal water tariff where price is equal to 
marginal cost of supplying the last unit. The choice of water pricing method however will 
also depend on factors such as institutions, administration and monitoring capabilities, 
the establishment and control of metering devices, the ability to collect fees, as well as 
enforcement issues. There are difficulties associated with marginal cost (MC) pricing 
because MC is multidimensional, i.e., it includes several inputs such as water quantity 
and quality, and the fact that MC varies over the time period measured (i.e., short-run vs 
long-run MC). 
 
When sophisticated monitoring technology is available, then tiered pricing, and two-part 
tariffs (fixed and volumetric) are feasibly introduced. Tiered pricing for irrigation water 
for example is common in Israel (Yaron, 1997). This was initially introduced in 1974 but 
then abandoned in 1977 due to farmers political pressure. Agricultural tier pricing was re-
introduced in 1989 however and continues to be in effect today. For water from Mekerot, 
the national water company, farmers pay a progressively increasing price for the first 50, 
 16
second 30, and final 20 percent of their water quota. Farmers using more water than their 
quota provides pay much more for the excess. To avoid these punitive charges, farmers 
generally partake in interfarm transfers of water. By allocating some water through 
quotas, it is believed that socially undesirable outcomes with respect to the distributional 
issues are prevented.   
 
The effectiveness of a tax depends on the correct estimation of the marginal tax level and 
on how risk averse farmers are with respect to damage from reduced water availability 
(both in quality and quantity terms). A differentiated tax level has to be created, because 
of local differences in both the monetary value of reserves and vulnerability of the 
environment to changes in the groundwater level. An advantage of a tax is that it 
improves both economic and technical efficiency. Administrative costs are high, since a 
differentiated tax is not easy to control and monitor. The financial impact on affected 
parties depends on the restitution of revenues, which affects tax acceptability. Finally 
there are practical implementation problems. It is hard to define a good basis for a tax. A 
volumetric tax on extraction is complicated, since it involves high monitoring costs. A 
tax on a change in the groundwater level is also complicated, because external and 
stochastic factors affect the level of groundwater, which is not uniform across any given 
aquifer. Charging water-boards for lowering surface water levels will not influence an 
individuals farmer's behavior, but it will affect the strategy of groups of farmers 
represented in the governing body of water-boards. 
 
Specific taxes for groundwater abstraction have been adopted in the Netherlands and in 
France (OECD, 2002). In the Netherlands this was introduced in January 1995 at a 
standard rate of 0.15 euro/m3, and at a rate of 0.025 euro/m3 for infiltrated groundwater.  
 
4.3 Pollution taxes 
Pollution taxes represent an efficient method of addressing water quality problems if 
these are adopted at the optimum level. Pigouvian taxes are statically and dynamically 
efficient as they induce users to innovate. Pollution taxes to address groundwater 
pollution have been implemented in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, where they 
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are targeted at non-point source pollution from agriculture, and are imposed on nitrogen 
fertilizers.  
 
4.4 Subsidies 
Subsidies can be directly implemented for water saving measures to induce users to 
behave in a more environmentally friendly way. Alternatively, indirect subsidy schemes 
also exist which include tax concessions and allowances, and guaranteed minimum 
prices. Subsidies however are not economically efficient, they create distortions and do 
not provide incentives for the adoption of modern technologies. Acceptability, however is 
not an issue, since participation in subsidy schemes is voluntary and has positive financial 
implications.  
 
4.5 Tradable permits 
Another instrument prescribed by economists in the face of demand-supply imbalances is 
the introduction of water markets (Anderson and Hill, 1997; Howitt, 1997) in which 
water rights, or permits, can be traded. The rationale behind water allocation through 
tradable rights is that in a perfectly competitive market, permits will flow to their highest 
value use (Tietenberg, 2000). Different types of tradable permit systems can be 
established which address different aspects of the water resource problem (Kraemer and 
Banholzer, 1999). These are: 
• Tradable water abstraction rights for quantitative water resource management. These 
can permanent and unlimited (property rights to the water resource) or temporary and 
limited (transferable rights to sue water without right of abuse). 
• Tradable discharge permits for the protection and management of (surface) water 
quality. Such pollution permits can be allocated to point or to non-point sources and 
trades can also be arranged among different kinds of sources. (For examples from the 
U.S.A. and Australia, see Kraemer et al 2003) 
• Tradable permits to use or consume water-borne resources such as fish or the potential 
energy of water at height for example.  
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Generally, the government will determine the optimal level of water resource use over a 
specified time period (e.g., annually or seasonally) and will allocated a limited number of 
permits that reflect the optimal level to the different water users. Permit holders that gain 
lower benefits from using their permits (due to e.g. higher costs) have an incentive to sell 
them to users who value them more. The sale results in mutual benefit as each user is 
better off.  
 
The financial impact on affected parties and related acceptability of tradable permits 
depends on the initial allocation of rights. These can either be distributed for free (e.g. 
depending on historical use or other criteria), or auctioned off to the highest bidders. If 
they are auctioned, revenues are created that the government can earmark for other 
environmental purposes. The use of tradable rights for groundwater seems to be 
complicated in practice, since the impact of changes in the groundwater level on 
agricultural production and nature depends on location specific circumstances. To avoid 
transferring rights among areas with heterogeneous characteristics, trading has to be 
restricted.  
 
Tradable water permit systems have been implemented in a number of countries 
including Chile, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Spain, several states in Australia, and the Northern 
Colorado Water Conservancy District in the U.S.A (Marino and Kemper, 1999).  
 
4.6 Voluntary Agreements 
Another policy option for controlling surface and groundwater use are voluntary 
agreements between farmers and government organizations. Participation in such control 
programs is encouraged by means of positive incentives (a restitution of taxes). Such 
programs try to convince farmers (through education) of the advantages of fine-tuned 
groundwater control. Voluntary agreements on controlling groundwater use are efficient, 
since they rely on specialized knowledge of participants about local conditions. When 
costs and benefits are not equitably distributed among affected parties, both parties can 
bargain about compensation payments. The allocation of such payments depends on the 
assignment of rights. Acceptability is not an issue, since it is a voluntary regime. Because 
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of these advantages, participation of farmers in planning and decision-making at the local 
level is becoming more common. The principle of allowing the individual members of 
agricultural organization and water boards to make decisions on issues that affect them 
rather than leaving those decisions to be made by the whole group, the so-called 
`principle of subsidiary', is widely accepted. 
 
4.7 Liability for Damage 
Environmental liability systems intend to internalize and recover the costs of 
environmental damage through legal action and to make polluters pay for the damage 
their pollution causes. If the penalties are sufficiently high, and enforcement is effective, 
liability for damage can provide incentives for taking preventative measures. For liability 
to be effective, there need to be one or more identifiable actors (polluters); the damage 
needs to be concrete and quantifiable; and a causal link needs to be established between 
the damage and the identified polluter.  
 
Table 1 
Classification of Economic Instruments 
Economic Instrument Advantages Disadvantages 
1. Standards and Quotas 
 
 Not economically efficient 
2. Water abstraction charges Adjustment of price signals 
to reflect actual resource 
costs; encourage new 
technologies; flexibility; 
generation of revenues 
Low charges will have 
minimal impact on user 
behaviour and will continue 
in resource over-utilzation 
3. Pollution charges Same as water abstraction 
charges; polluter-pays 
principle 
Same as water abstraction 
charges 
4. Subsidies 
 
Readily acceptable Not economically efficient 
5. Tradable permits Quantity based targets that May entail high transaction 
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 are able to attain least-cost 
outcome. Allows flexibility. 
costs.  
6. Voluntary agreements 
 
Readily acceptable  
7. Liability legislation Assess and recover 
damages ex-post but can 
also act as prevention 
incentives 
Require an advanced legal 
system; high control costs; 
burden of proof 
 
 
5. A Methodology for the Implementation of the Economic Aspects of the WFD  
 
In this section we outline the methodology we propose for application to the WFD.  This 
methodology is based on 1) the identification of the appropriate unit for management; 2) 
the agreement of the objectives of water allocation 3) the evaluation of the various 
attributes of water demand within that unit; 4) the identification of optimal water resource 
allocations relative to objectives; 5) the assessment of the impacts of the proposed 
reallocation. 
 
5. 1 The appropriate unit for management 
The watershed is a natural unit of analysis for addressing the balance of supply and 
demand for water, and the issues of efficiency, equity and sustainability for a number of 
reasons. First, the aggregate availability of water resources, including sustainable yields 
is bounded by the hydrological cycle of the watershed. Second, the interaction of 
different water sources (e.g. groundwater and surface water) is confined by the 
watershed. Third, the demands for water interact within the watershed and the 
hydrological impacts of one water user upon another and upon environment; that is, 
externalities are defined by the watershed. For these reasons, an understanding of the 
hydrological cycle in the watershed area in question is a pre-requisite for the 
determination of efficient, equitable and sustainable water resource allocation. 
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5.2 The objectives of water allocation 
Given the natural water resource constraints there is a clear need to address the pattern 
and growth of water demands in order to address the imbalance. The methodology 
proposed provides the policy maker and planner with an objective approach to balancing 
the competing demands for water subject to the natural constraints. The approach is based 
on the comparison of the economic value of water in different sectors, in terms of 
quantity and quality, in comparable units of measurement. The overall objective of public 
policy is to maximise societal welfare from a given natural resource base subject to those 
valuations. The key objectives of public policy in the allocation of resources are as 
follows: 
 
 Efficiency: Economic efficiency is defined as an organisation of production and 
consumption such that all unambiguous possibilities for increasing economic well-
being have been exhausted (Young 1996). For water, this is achieved where the 
marginal social benefits of water use are equated to the marginal social cost of 
supply, or for a given source, where the marginal social benefits of water use are 
equated across users. 
 
 Equity: Social welfare is likely to depend upon the fairness of distribution of 
resources and impacts across society, as well as economic efficiency. Equal access to 
water resources, the distribution of property rights, and the distribution of the costs 
and benefits of policy interventions, are examples of equity considerations for water 
policy. 
 
 Environment and Sustainability: The sustainable use of water resources has 
become another important aspect in determining the desirable allocation of water 
from the perspective of society. Consideration of intergenerational equity and the 
critical nature of ecological services provided by water resources provide two 
rationales for considering sustainability. In addition the in situ value and public good 
nature of water resources should enter into water allocation decisions. 
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5.3 The evaluation of water demand 
For physical, social and economic reasons, water is a classic non-marketed resource. 
Even as a direct consumption good, market prices for water are seldom available or when 
observable, often are subject to biases; subsidies, taxes etc. Similarly, environmental and 
ecological water values are rarely explicitly marketed and priced. Thus the economic 
value of water resources is seldom observed directly. The balancing of demands to 
resolve the resource conflicts described above requires the identification and comparison 
of the benefits and costs of water resource development and allocation among alternative 
and competing uses. In addition, water management policies have widespread effects on 
the quantity and quality of water within a watershed, and the timing and location of 
supplies for both in- and off-stream uses. In general, these impacts have an economic 
dimension, either positive or negative, which must be taken into account in policy 
formulation. Again, the value of these impacts is seldom observed directly.  
 
Fortunately economists have refined a number of techniques to value water resources and 
address objectively the balance of demands and evaluate the impacts of water 
management policy. The first step towards the evaluation of economic benefits requires 
the identification of the demands for the resource. Water is needed for all economic and 
social activities, so the evaluator is faced with the problem of identifying a multi-sectoral 
demand curve. The dimensions of demand include municipal and industrial, agricultural, 
tourism and environmental (recreation, amenity and ecological). 
 
The valuation of each of the identified demands calls for a different approach for two 
main reasons, a) the specific economic and hydrological context: data availability etc and 
b) because the use of the resource is sector-specific. The residential and tourist sectors 
exploit the use value of water and use it as a consumption good; the agricultural sector 
derives use value from water as an input in production. The value of water related 
environmental goods can be a use value or a non-use value, e.g. existence value. The 
overall evaluation strategy is shown in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
The valuation techniques allow the estimation of the following desirable parameters: 
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  Marginal Value of Water: The efficient balance of demands from a given source is 
found where the marginal value (benefit) of water is equated across users. In any 
given context efficiency is achieved where the marginal value of water is equated to 
marginal social cost 
 
 Price Elasticities of Demand (PED): Measures the responsiveness of demand to 
price changes. Characterises the demand function and tells the policy maker the 
extent to which prices must change to cause demand to fall to a particular, e.g. 
efficient, sustainable, level. 
 
 Income Elasticity of Demand (IED): Measures the extent to which the demand for 
water varies with income. Tells the policy maker whether water is a necessity or a 
luxury good and provides one way in which to assess the fairness of pricing policies. 
In combination with PED can be used to estimate welfare changes resulting from 
policies. 
 
 Marginal/Average Willingness to Pay for Public Goods (WTP): Estimates the 
strength of demand for water as an environmental good. This determines in part the 
efficient environmental allocation of water 
 
 Marginal Willingness to Pay for Quality Changes of Common Access Resources: 
Estimates the value of quality attributes of the resource, which are particularly 
important, if the resource is used as a productive input.  
 
 Risk Parameters: Measurement of preferences towards risk and uncertainty. Useful 
for establishing policies, which reduce the impacts of risk on consumer groups 
occasioned by reason of variability in water availability.  
 
5.4. Balancing water demands in the watershed 
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The outputs of the demand analysis allow the determination of the economically efficient 
allocations of water resources.  The first element of an economically efficient allocation 
is the equi-marginal principle: this provides that each use of the water resource should 
achieve the same benefit from that water at the margin.  In short, if water is more heavily 
valued at the margin in one sector than another, then it should be reallocated toward that 
sector until equality is achieved.  The second element of the economically efficient 
allocation is that aggregate water resources are allocated efficiently where the marginal 
social benefit of their use is equated to the marginal social cost of supply. 
 
One option for achieving an economically efficient water allocation is the use of the 
instrument of water pricing, where water is uniformly and universally charged at the 
marginal social cost of supply, which has the following implications. First, competing 
demands will each make use of the supply until its marginal benefit is equated with 
marginal social costs of supply (the equi-marginal principle).  Note that this implies that 
every use must receive an equal marginal benefit from water resources. The second 
implication is that aggregate demand for water will expand until the marginal benefit is 
equated with the marginal social cost of supply (aggregate efficiency).  Note that this 
implies that demand is endogenous and managed within this model. The third implication 
is that the key to the success of the policy is the determination of the appropriate marginal 
social cost of supply and the marginal benefits to environmental uses.  Note that this 
implies that the methodology used for implementing the policy is as important as the 
method that is used for determining it. 
 
5.5. Deriving Policies from the Methodologies – Policy Impact Analysis 
There is a second phase to the water allocation methodology that flows from the 
consideration of the implementation of the conclusions from the first.  First, the 
discussion here has largely been phrased in terms of the use of water pricing as the 
appropriate allocation mechanism, but this need not necessarily be the best or more 
appropriate instrument for allocating water in every context. There are many different 
approaches to enable the efficient allocation of water resources – pricing, marketable 
permits, even auctions. (Dinar 1996, Winpenny 1994, Easter et al 1999). Ultimately the 
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particular context (watershed) must be considered for the feasibility of the various 
instruments, and the policy maker must determine the most appropriate allocation 
mechanism within that context. 
 
Secondly, it is crucial to note that an economically efficient allocation need not 
necessarily be an equitable or sustainable one.   Additional analysis is required to assess 
the distributional impacts of the allocation recommended by the equi-marginal principle.  
The hydrological impacts of the allocation need to be assessed, in order to assess whether 
the various demands are compatible within the existing watershed. Finally, the continued 
provision of basic environmental services within the watershed needs to be considered. In 
sum, the watershed needs to be double checked for unforeseen externalities and for 
missing markets for watershed services to ensure intra and inter-temporal efficiency is 
achieved and that equity and sustainability considerations are properly considered. 
 
The methodology can be thought of as two complementary stages, the first consisting of 
an objective approach to ascertaining economically efficient water allocations and the 
latter phase consisting of the policy impact analysis. 
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Figure The Methodology for Water Demand Valuation in a Watershed Area: Examples 
from the Kouris Watershed Case Study 
 
 
Valuing Water in a Watershed in the Absence of Market Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identification of Sector Specific Water Demands present in the Watershed Area
 
 
Households Tourism EnvironmentAgriculture
 
 
 Methods of Estimation of Sector Specific Water Demands: CYPRUS 
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Deriving the Demand 
for Water given Existing 
Tariff Pricing Structure 
 
Method: Econometric 
Estimation 
 
Data:  
• Household specific 
income, water bills, 
other socio-economic 
characteristics, 
location of household 
and characteristics of 
residence 
• Detailed 
information on tariff 
pricing structure 
among localities.  
 
Outcome:  
• Price Water 
Demand Elasticities 
• Income Water 
Demand Elasticities  
Investigating 
Agricultural and 
Tourism  land-use  
 
Valuing Groundwater 
Quality in Coastal 
Watersheds 
 
Method: Combination 
of Hedonic and Travel 
Cost 
 
Data:  
• Survey on parcel 
specific attributes 
and socio-
economic 
characteristics of 
owners 
 
Outcome:  
• Willingness to 
Pay for 
Agricultural Land 
and groundwater 
Investigating the 
Efficient Allocation of 
Groundwater Over 
Agricultural and 
Residential Users and 
Over Time 
 
Method: Dynamic 
Mathematical 
Programming 
 
Data:  
• Hydrological data 
from hydro-
geological models 
• Economic data from 
Econometric 
Estimation 
 
Outcome:  
• Efficient sectoral 
allocation of water 
given the equi-
marginal principle 
• Estimation of the 
marginal value of 
groundwater 
• Identification of the 
Optimal Timing for 
Desalination Use  
Objective Balance Between Competing and Alternative Demands 
Valuing Wetlands 
Preservation 
 
Method: 
Contingent 
Valuation 
 
Data: Survey 
Questionnaire 
 
Outcome: WTP 
for preserving the 
marshes. Establish 
the regional nature 
of WTP 
5. 6  Summary of Methodology 
 
STAGE I: Objective Approach to Balancing Water Demands 
 
Evaluate Demands. Apply appropriate methodologies to assess characteristics of the 
demand for water arising from individual, sectoral and environmental uses.  Derive the 
parameters of water demand required for policy purposes: Marginal Value, PED, IED, 
WTP, and risk parameters for all the relevant dimensions of demand. The evaluation 
process should be undertaken in accordance with carefully constructed methodologies, 
and be independent of any prior rights to water resources.  This enables an evaluation of 
water uses according to the benefits that accrue to all of society from them. 
 
Determine Efficient Allocations. Evaluate the relative values accruing to society by 
virtue of differing water allocations.  Determine those water allocations that achieve an 
economically optimal balance.  An economically optimal allocation is one in which 
aggregate demands are balanced with supply according to the equation of marginal social 
value (benefit) to the marginal social cost of supply, and in which each source of demand 
is achieving equal value from its marginal allocation of water.  
 
Ascertain Impacts of Implementing Efficient Allocation. The policy maker may 
choose from a wide variety of instruments to effect the desirable allocation (tradable 
permits, pricing, auctions).  Any proposed method of implementation should be 
considered for feasibility within the relevant watershed, and then evaluated for its broader 
impacts on the society.  This evaluation process leads into Stage II of the Methodology.  
 
STAGE II: Policy Impact Analysis 
 
Welfare Distribution. The impact of the allocation policy options should be evaluated to 
establish the resulting distribution of the costs and benefits to society. That is, the change 
in social deadweight loss resulting from resource allocation changes should be 
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determined, together with the actual distribution of this change. This is important both 
from the perspective of equity and often for reasons of political economy.   
 
Market Failures and Missing Markets. Consideration of sectoral demands in isolation 
may be insufficient to ensure efficient outcomes. Where water users are conjoined by the 
underlying hydrology of the watershed there are a number of potential 
impacts/externalities that may arise from the chosen allocation. For example, policies 
implemented in upstream areas of a watershed will impact upon downstream users where 
the water resources are conjoined. Ignoring these effects will lead to inefficient 
allocations of water. In effect all the following facets of water demand should be 
considered: (a) Sectoral allocation, that is water demands should be balanced between 
sectors; (b) Spatial allocation, that is spatial variability and the conjoined nature of 
surface and groundwater; and (c) Temporal allocation, that is conjoined users may 
impose externalities upon each other relating to allocation over time and the timing of 
resource use. Other externalities arise from the demand for public goods, which 
frequently extends beyond the watershed. Global and regional environmental goods for 
which existence, bequest and option values are held provide an example of this. 
Furthermore, where water scarcity is extreme, demands for water outside the watershed 
may induce investments in inter-basin transfers.  
 
Institutional and Legislative Analysis. As one of the main obstacles to water re-
allocations a review of the legislative and institutional environment required to effect the 
desired allocation may finally be required. 
 
The methodology described above addresses the problem of water resource allocation at 
the level of the watershed and provides policy makers and resource managers with a 
concrete procedure for attaining economic efficiency targets whilst considering equity 
and environmental sustainability. The methodology proposes that competing demands, 
including the environment, are traded off against one another and balanced against extant 
hydrological constraints using the of notion of economic efficiency, the marginal 
valuation of water and the equi-marginal principle. The valuation exercises are 
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undertaken independently of prevailing property rights regimes for water resources and 
hence allow the characterisation of efficient/optimal allocations of water, rather than 
those tainted by property rights uncertainties, open access and missing markets. 
 
However, economic efficiency itself must be traded-off against the contributions to social 
welfare derived from equitable distributions of resources and policy impacts such as 
employment. Similarly the complex nature of hydrological linkages requires additional 
analysis to establish the value of water resources in non-marketed watershed services 
such as drought mitigation/risk reduction and coastal wetlands. In addition demands for 
in situ environmental services external to the watershed need to be considered along with 
other potentially subtle market failures. Where not addressed in Stage I, these 
considerations are captured by Stage II of the methodology. In sum, the integrated water 
resource management approach attempts to provide a coherent procedure for overcoming 
the water resource allocation problem addressed at the level of the watershed. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The importance of appropriate economic considerations in all aspects of water resources 
management is becoming increasingly recognized. This chapter has presented the 
necessary procedures for implementing an integrated approach from an economic 
perspective which consists of the characterization of the river basin, an assessment of 
current cost recovery, and the identification of economic instruments and measures that 
are able to evaluate the true economic cost of water (including financial, environmental 
and resource costs), and to provide policy-makers with the tools to allocate water in an 
efficient manner. The theory and applications of these valuation methods (hedonic 
pricing, travel cost methods, contingent valuations and choice modeling, among others) 
and the economic instruments (abstraction and pollution taxes, subsidies, and use of 
tradable permits) are described and illustrated with case studies.  
 
Finally, we present a methodology for implementing the economic considerations of the 
EU Water Framework Directive. This takes into consideration the efficiency aspects of 
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water allocation as well as the equity, environmental, and sustainability issues. Together, 
these can help to provide policy prescriptions that endeavor to provide an integrated 
water resources management framework.  
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